group has been given a variety of names, including 'Ahlulsunna wai'jama'ah hijra and . . . the "Nigerian Taliban" and "Yusufiyyah" sect' (Aghedo and Osumah 2012, 858) ; Yusufiyah (movement of Yusof); or simply Al-Sunna wal Jamma (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012; Watts 2009). The Boko Haram base in Kannama (Yobe State, near the Niger border) was known locally as 'Afghanistan' (Ifeka 2010, 41; Pham 2012, 2; Elkaim 2012, 13) . This article uses 'Boko Haram' simply because that is the most familiar name. 'Boko' is frequently taken to mean 'book' (Adesoji 2011, 106) or 'book learning' (Pham 2012, 2) but this is disputed by linguists, with claims that it is a word that initially meant fake but has come to be associated with the Latin alphabet as opposed to the Arabic, and from that to mean education (Newman 2013); or that there is no Hausa root to the word (Manfredi 2014). 'Haram' means forbidden, or sacrilege rather than sinful. The name is therefore frequently glossed as 'Western Education is forbidden', but it has a wider resonance of Western values or civilisation, or those who take Western money and do not act charitably towards the normal people. 'Yan boko' is a phrase used to describe 'the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonize Nigeria -the people who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values'. Such people are thus seen as 'spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim umma (community) ' (Walker 2012, 7; see Cook 2011, 11-12) . 'Westernisation is forbidden' would be closer to the sense. Some of their rejection of modern science has led to fantastic claims: that the earth is flat, that it was created in days not over millennia, that rain is not caused by evaporation, etc. (see Anonymous 2012, 125; Oyeniyi 2014, 79-80 ). Yet as Walker notes 'Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The group's use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits them' (Walker 2012, 7) .
The group has been operating since around 2007, when Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam was assassinated in a mosque in Kano. He has criticised the hard-line Islam of Ustaz Mohammed Yusof, who had established a mosque in Maiduguri. It was this mosque, and Yusof's teaching, which had been characterised by its neighbours as 'Boko Haram'. The group's message spread beyond Borno state into neighbouring areas including Yobe and Bauchi, and the split from the more moderate northern Islamic establishment was cemented by the assassination of Sheikh Adam (Walker 2012, 3-4; see Oyeniyi 2014) . The group's origins have been related to the 'Maitatsine' uprisings of the 1980s, named after the preacher Muhammed Marwa, whose nickname was Maitatsine, 'the one who damns', after his critical speeches (Adesoji 2011) . The flashpoint in 2009 is much disputed, with one predominant story being about police stopping them for refusing to wear motorcycle helmets (see Last 2009) . This initial encounter between supporters of Yusof and the police led to attacks on police stations. The group and the police fought pitched battles, and led to the death of the group's leader Yusuf in police custody, and several members imprisoned. Many people were executedtied up and shot in the back of the head -and many others died in firefights. There are reports of police using machine guns inside of mosques (Ifeka 2010, 42) . The so-called 'Boko Haram riots' of 26-30 July 2009 in the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno immediately followed the attack on the group's hideout in the Dutsen Tenshin area of Bauchi. Estimates of deaths in these protests, the riots and the crackdown range from over 700 (Adesoji 2011; Ifeka 2010) to between 1000 and 1400 (Ogunrotifa 2013, 49) .
Many of the group's followers left Nigeria at this time, and there are various reports of them ending up in Niger, Mali or Algeria. This is one of the sources of the recurrent stories of links to other Islamic groups in the Sahel. It has been suggested that Yusuf's former deputy Abubaker Shekau -wounded but seemingly not killed in 2009 -moved to northern Cameroon at this time (Walker 2012, 4-5) . Since that date the group's operations have been diverse, initially in the geographical area they were most closely associated with, and then developing from it. There have been reports that some of their members came from Chad, and spoke Arabic rather than a tribal language (Ifeka 2010, 40) , but also suggestions that there may be different groups in different cities, loosely affiliated like a franchise (Last M unpublished January 2012, 1-2). The group certainly needs to be understood as one group among many in the north of Nigeria.
In State 2010, 22; Cook 2011, 12) . It launched new attacks on the city of Jos and on the Mogadishu barracks in the capital of Abuja. In October 2010, posters appeared across northern Nigeria telling people not to support security forces looking for Boko Haram, signed by AQIM, and also telling Muslims who broke Sharia that they would also be killed (US Department of State 2010, 22; Maiangwa et al. 2012, 47-8) .
On 16 June 2011, the police headquarters in the capital Abuja was bombed, leading to a city-wide curfew. This attack used a vehicle with a bomb inside driven into the police headquarters, following the convoy of the Inspector General of the Police Force. The vehicle was stopped, but the driver was able to detonate the bomb and kill two people and destroy several vehicles (US Department of State 2011, 25; Pham 2012, 4) . The group's strategies had previously included remote detonation of bombs and shootings, but the suicide bombing in 2011 was a new development, previously unknown in the country (Waldek and Jayasekara 2011, 174; Aghedo and Osumah 2012, 858; Elkaim 2012, 18) , leading to Nigerian claims that the group must be making use of people from Niger or other African states, because no Nigerian would do this (Last M unpublished January 2012, 2). In August 2011 the United Nations building in Abuja was bombed in another suicide bombing. Videos of the attacker were released, tying the events to the killing of Osama bin Laden a few months before. This was a building that also housed other Western agencies. Twenty-five people were killed and over 80 wounded.
Boko Haram has financed its operations through crime, possibly from funds raised from AQIM kidnappings, and certainly supplemented with bank raids, robberies of convoys and businesses, car-jacking and other criminal activities (Barrett 2012, 723; Davis 2012; Walker 2012; Waldek and Jayasekara 2011) . Boko Haram gets many of its guns from the police, often by raiding remote police stations, or from the army, sometimes buying them directly from soldiers or security guards (Last 2009). Smaller-scale attacks are common, especially on people who are engaging in activities that they find haram -gambling, drinking, prostitution and so on. They often arrive on motorbike or three-wheeled taxi for a quick getaway, shooting or throwing bombs at their targets. Some of their bombs are tiny, small enough to be contained in a soft-drinks can. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous other attacks, many of which are further from their northeast bases. These included an attack on a military base in Kaduna, and many in the highly contested city of Jos, in Plateau state, which is on the rough border between Christian and Muslim populations, and in a state that has not adopted Sharia (Figure 2 ). Suicide bombs are becoming much more frequent. There have been various attacks on churches, including on Easter and Christmas days. These attacks are part of a wider attempt to get Christians to leave the north of the country. In December 2011, and again in May 2013, a state of emergency was declared in the northeast of Nigeria. The latter remains in force at the time of writing.
The 20 January 2012 Kano attacks
On Friday 20 January 2012, after morning prayers, a series of attacks were launched by Boko Haram against the northern city of Kano. Initial reports were of the freeing of prisoners in police stations, which were subsequently bombed. A number of government buildings including passport offices and two immigration centres, several police stations, and the headquarters of the State Security Service were targeted. There were also some attacks on churches. Several of these attacks were with bombs, but there were also firefights between Boko Haram members and the Nigerian police and security forces. Several unexploded car bombs and smaller explosives were found in the city after the attacks were over.
Kano is a very large (499 sq km), sprawling city. The city is in the north of the country, much of which still exists as a semi-nomadic, pastoralist society (see Maconachie 2007) . While it is an ancient city, its population has increased dramatically in the last 50 years, from only a quarter of a million in 1961 to over 3 million today (Hills 2012, 49; ICG 2010, 22) . Kano has few high-rise buildings -much of the accommodation is in a series of gated compounds, and informal settlements. Ninety-five percent of the population are Muslim, mostly Sunni, and mainly from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group (Hills 2012, 49) . Hausa is the main language, with English widely spoken. There is an unequal distribution of wealth; and limited access to basic services and infrastructure (see Hills 2012, 49) .
The January 2012 attacks were carried out by a number of groups of Boko Haram members. Walker suggests that there were 'three groups of gunmen and suicide bombers' (2012 6), but there were likely to be more, especially as they were able to free some of their members from prison in the initial actions. The group used military tactics of securing areas before launching attacks, setting up their own roadblocks and other means of establishing control. Territorial strategies were therefore used in an urban setting; something akin to military counter-terrorist actions. Estimates of deaths vary widely -most put the number at between 150 and 200 (Walker 2012, 6; Ploch 2012, 12) , but people who were in the city that day put the number much higher, certainly several hundred, perhaps around a thousand. The discrepancy is partly due to the uneven nature of the Nigerian media (see Themnér and Wallensteen 2010, 530) . Most stated figures come from the numbers of bodies at a morgue, but bodies were taken to more than one, yet no sources seem to aggregate the data. One doctor from Murtala Mohammed hospital in Kano put the figure at 178 from his own hospital and the one at Nasarawa, but said that this was not the whole total: 'There could be more, because some bodies have not yet come in and others were collected early' (quoted in Oboh 2012). There were also bodies not taken to morgues, but taken by or released to family members who buried them quickly; and because the morgues were quickly overwhelmed, bodies were piled up outside or in other locations, often uncounted. Some of the deaths were not people killed by Boko Haram but by the police and security services, often in indiscriminate reprisals. There are therefore reasons why they do not want the full magnitude of the day's events to become known. The security services have used mass graves before: in the 1980s following the Maitatsine riots, an estimated 4000 bodies were dumped outside Kano's western wall (Last M unpublished January 2012, 1). Shortly after the attacks, a 15 min video was posted to YouTube of Shekau, or a possible stand-in, discussing the actions, and Boko Haram put out a statement:
In the name of Allah, Peace and Mercy! We are the group called 'forbidden' that is Boko Haram but we love to call ourselves Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Liddaawati wal Jihad. This message is to all inhabitants of Kano State, especially the security agencies, those arresting our brothers and telling the media they are arresting thieves or armed robbers. These are our brothers they are arresting. We don't have the right to attack those who don't attack us but our war is with the government fighting Muslims, its security agencies and Christians (under C. A. N.), those killing Muslims and even eating their flesh and all those helping security agents even if they are Muslims. Anybody who becomes an accomplice to arresting our brothers should wait for our visit . . .
Message from Leader Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Liddaawati wal Jihad. Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad (Shekau) (quoted in SaharaReporters 2012) Kano has changed since the 2012 attacks, with a much stronger security presence, and many Christians moving south. Ironically, before these attacks it was seen as a relatively stable city, with good policing systems and not the distrust found in other northern cities (Hills 2012). Since early 2012 a number of aid agencies or foreign government workers have relocated to Abuja or elsewhere in the country. Boko Haram have often started their attacks with men on motorbikes -easier to manoeuvre through roadblocks and Nigeria's traffic, and quick to use for escape afterwards. Many of the 20 January Kano attacks were launched in this way. This led to increased police and military presence in the city, with riders forced to dismount and wheel bikes through checkpoints. Motorbikes have been banned entirely within the city of Maidugari in Borno state for some years. Following the assassination attempt on the Emir of Kano in January 2013, Kano imposed a ban on passengers on motorcycles -something that has had a dramatic effect on the economy of many people, as motorbikes are used as a cheap taxi ride, with drivers using this to pay for fuel.
The biopolitics and geopolitics of Nigeria's 'war on terror'
Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with an estimated 150 million population: roughly 50% Muslim, 40% Christian and the rest indigenous religions such as animism. Nigeria is a nation-state with enormous inequalities of wealth. Many states within the Federation have absolute poverty levels above 70%, with many of those located in the northeast (Osumah 2013). In part this is due to geographical issues -the oil is concentrated in the south, as are the main international trade opportunities; the north is on the edge of the Sahel and frequently suffers from droughts and famines. The drought of the 1970s to 1980s led to widespread desertification and destroyed the pastoral livelihoods of the Fulani people (see Watts 2013 Watts [1983 ). Other problems concern the class, tribal and generational relations in the country (see Ifeka 2010; Ogunrotifa 2013; Rogers 2012). The economy in the north has largely collapsed, and there are a large number of unemployed youth (Lubeck 2011; Lubeck et al. 2007) . As Le Billon (2005, 24) noted, 'over the past 30 years, more than $350bn worth of oil has come out of the Nigerian ground, but the percentage of Nigerians surviving on less than $1 a day has risen from 36% to 70%'. For a country that has per capita income of $2700 and 7% growth in GDP (Johnson 2011), this is a staggering figure, and unrest unsurprising (see Agbiboa 2013b; Yusuf 2013).
Western, especially US, markets looked to Nigeria in the first decade of this century as a safer source of crude oil compared with the Middle East (Ifeka 2010, 31). Watts has described the situation as 'living within the oil assemblage that is contemporary Nigeria ' (2009, np) . His analysis is also helpful in pointing to a range of what he calls 'governable spaces' that question Nigeria itself, ones that 'generated forms of rule, conduct and imagining at cross purposes with one another, antithetical to the very idea of a developed modern nation-state that oil represented ' (Watts 2004, 61) . The state has been dominated by the military for most of the period since independence, with elections of civilian governments often characterised by violence between sides and corruption. But the concentration of power if profoundly even, and local and regional rulers or oga, big men, exercise considerable force in economic and political matters.
Nigeria's constitution has a longstanding commitment to using the military for the purpose on maintaining its territorial integrity, outlining its purpose as.
Defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea and air, suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President. (1979 ( s.179, 1989 ( s.215, 1999 ( s.218 in Omede 2011 The international legal notion of 'territorial integrity' has been under considerable pressure since the advent of humanitarian intervention and especially the 'war on terror'. State 2010, 22; 2011, 5) . However Abdulmutallab, while from the Nigerian city of Kaduna, was radicalised in Yemen. There are no known links between him and Boko Haram (ICG 2010, 19) . Equally, the two killers of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London in 2013, though of Nigerian parentage, were British citizens since birth and had no apparent links to militant groups in Nigeria itself. Links between Boko Haram and AQIM are possible, but the idea can serve the propaganda purposes of both groups and the Nigerian state. Even within Boko Haram its cell-like structure means that a unified command is difficult to see, and negotiation and ceasefires unlikely to bind all elements within it (Walker 2012, 8, 11-12) .
Boko Haram is therefore not the only challenge facing the Nigerian state. It is important to distinguish between Boko Haram, broadly in the north-east, with other Islamic groups broadly in the north-west that may have affinities with AQIM, and that link to events in Algeria and Mali. Some of these groups are selfdetermination movements. The labelling of northern groups as 'al-Qaeda', 'African Taliban' or 'Taliban' is partly due to simple association by act, being so-named by local communities, rather than by actual linkages. Adesoji suggests, though, without much evidence, that Boko Haram is getting support from global jihadist groups and specifically claims 'affinity with the North Africa branch of Al-Qaeda' (2011, 105) The suggestion that Nigeria is not far from being a 'failed state' is common: 'If a primary characteristic of a failed state is that its government has little or no control over a significant part of its territory, Nigeria's condition is not good ' (Campbell 2011, 139; see Maiangwa et al. 2012; Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, 31-3) . While the 'failed state' idea often expects states to live up to an unrealistic, Western-derived model of what states are supposed to be (Elden 2009, ch. 2) , it is clear that the spatial extent of the Abuja government's sovereignty is profoundly uneven. Even back in 2011 there were concerns that the states of Borno and Yobe were becoming separate from the rest of Nigeria, and that Boko Haram was likely to be seen as 'the one group that can actually project power and hold out the illusion of security to the people' (Cook 2011, 24) . Former US ambassador John Campbell's suggestion is that Nigeria may be going the way not of secession on the model of the Biafran war, but closer to what has happened in Congo, where central government exercises only partial territorial control (2011, 140) . However, the geographical concentration of Boko Haram means that a de facto partition of the state is one of several possible outcomes. Indeed, the group has already been characterised as operating as a "state within a state," with a cabinet, its own religious police, and a large farm' (Walker 2012, 3), along with a micro-finance scheme and plans for 'schools, a hospital and markets' (Hansen and Aliyu Musa 2013, 9; Onapajo and Uzodike 2012, 28). If realised, this is similar to how Hezbollah operates within southern Lebanon. What happens within those areas is also important.
In his analysis of the Niger Delta, Watts (2004) points to the complex political economies and geographies of Nigeria. The health problems in the country are serious -although infection rates are relatively low compared with sub-Saharan Africa in general at 3.6%, this still means it has the second highest population with HIV in Africa, and it has the highest tuberculosis burden in the world (Ploch 2012, 14-15; see Ingram 2008) . It has widespread and nonseasonal malaria, regular cholera outbreaks, and has not eradicated other diseases, being only one of three countries along with Afghanistan and Pakistan that has endemic polio. In Borno state, 'only two percent of children younger than two years old have been vaccinated, 83 percent of young people are illiterate, and 48.5 percent of children do not go to school' (Elkaim 2012, 9). On 8 February 2013, between nine and twelve people working for a polio vaccination programme were shot dead in two health clinics in Kano. The gunmen arrived on three-wheel motortaxis. Only two days later, three Korean doctors in their beds were killed with machetes in the town of Potsikum in Yobe state. In this last instance it is not clear if they were killed because they were doctors, because they were foreigners, or because they were paying local women for sex. Journalists in Kano were arrested, on the charge of inciting the attacks on the health workers. A number of kidnappings, some in north-eastern Nigeria and some just over the border in Cameroon, were attributed to a Boko Haram offshoot named Ansaru: some of the hostages were later killed (ICG 2014, 26-29; see Zenn 2014) .
In terms of the reaction against health workers and health programmes there is something peculiar going on here with a group that is seeking control of territory, and control of law over that territory, also seeking to control the bodies that are within it, their health and the medicines that they have access to. A related reading could be made of the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls (Peters 2014) and of the group's more general targeting of women (Zenn and Pearson 2014) . One thing that the programmes and the resistance to them shows is that geopolitics and biopolitics need to be understood together, bodies in place and places embodied. Just as claims might be made of how Boko Haram operates in both these two registers, so too might an analysis of the Nigerian state, its principal donors, and the health organisations that it sponsors and endorses (see Ingram 2008) . There has long been resistance to immunisation campaigns, partly because of a belief 'that it is a Western and Christian plot sponsored by the federal government in Abuja to limit Muslim births' (Campbell 2013a). While this might appear fanciful, the militarisation of health security, and the controversial pharmaceutical trials that US companies have made in the past shows that there may be some basis for scepticism. Immunisation programmes are viewed with suspicion, partly as a result of the fake programme run by a Pakistani doctor working with the CIA in its hunt for Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, but also because of Muslim leaders claiming that the vaccinations can cause infertility or even polio itself (see Campbell 2013a; Abimbola et al. 2013; Yahya 2007) .
The 'global war on terror'
The north and west African aspects of a wider 'war on terror' have been explored in some detail (see Lyman 2009; Keenan 2009 Keenan , 2013 , though not with the attention paid to Afghanistan and Iraq or even the Horn of Africa. Nigeria has long been part of this wider picture. In a message broadcast on 11 February 2003, Osama bin Laden listed Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Morocco as among the apostate anti-Muslim states to be liberated by jihad (2005, 183) . Equally the 9/11 Commission Report identifies several places where they think terrorists would be likely to locate in future, including West Africa, especially Nigeria and Mali (2004, 366-7) . Given the wider context of interventions by French and allied forces in Mali (see Karmon 2014) , and the implications of the overthrow of Muammar Gadaffi in Libya for the wider region including Algeria, this demonstrates the new position these parts of Africa are playing within the continuing developments of the 'war on terror'. Nigerian troops going to join the AFISMA operation in Mali were attacked within Nigeria.
Developing from the earlier Pan-Sahel initiative and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism initiative, AFRICOM was authorised in 2007 and began operations in 2008 (Ifeka 2010 Keenan 2013, ch. 2) . AFRICOM has its base in Stuttgart, Germany and a secondary one in Camp Lemonier, Djiboutiboth a considerable distance from West Africa. Nigeria and Algeria were adamant that it should not have its command headquarters on African territory. In 2011 the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security characterised Boko Haram as an 'emerging threat to U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland ' (2011, 4) , as a reaction to the UN bombing but also, through its links to AQIM, to the Christmas Day bomb attempt by a Nigerian national. It also drew comparisons with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Pakistan Taliban. Robertson suggests that AFRICOM's 'Theater Strategic Objectives' can best be met by the use of 'Engagement Teams (ETs) to neutralize the foundation of the Boko Haram in Nigeria' (2012, 2), and especially future collaboration between Boko Haram and AQIM (2012, (4) (5) . Robertson cautions: 'it is critical that any outside footprint remain minimal due to the deep seated effects of colonialism, a strong resistance to U.S. occupation, and Nigeria's leading role as the premier country in West Africa ' (2012, 5) . The ETs being called for are 20-30 men teams, with at least a 50% Nigerian component 'including local state citizens, police, military and both Islamic and Christian religious leaders ' (2012, 5) . They would be 'highly vetted ' (2012, 8 ' (2012, 5-6) . Robertson asserts that 'the confluence of representatives from the aforementioned agencies would enable AFRICOM to bilaterally neutralise the foundations of Boko Haram ' (2012, 6) .
The proposal suggests that such ETs would be able to gather intelligence in advance, and strike preemptively, rather than work as the Nigerian state currently does which is after attacks. Robertson suggests that current Nigerian responses are hampered by the use of forces from the south in the north, and infiltration of sympathisers (2012, (6) (7) . She draws on the US experience in Vietnam to think about possible responses to this problem, discussing that war's Civil Operations and Rural Development and Support (CORDS) program. Robertson argues that 'CORDS intertwined civilian, military and the local populace to accomplish non-military functions during the Vietnam War. One lesson learned from CORDS is the importance of directly attacking the enemy's center of gravity: its ability to remain among the population ' (2012, 7) . Robertson argues that as well as these measures being designed to 'drastically limit the Boko Haram's ability to continue discrete operations among the northern Nigerian population . . . actions must also be taken to counteract safe havens and tolerance outside of Nigeria ' (2012, 9) . This requires her to suggest that the ETs would need to work with Nigeria's neighbours, drawing on US relations with Pakistan and India in relation to Afghanistan (2012, 9) .
ETs in Nigeria would pre-empt an all-out war that could potentially destabilise the entire region and block access to key US interests. Efforts by the Nigerian government to end the horrors brought about by the Islamic radicals of Boko Haram are simply not broad enough in scope to truly eradicate the roots of this insurgency. A purely military solution will not work. Rife with religious, economic and ethnic strife, corruption and many other traits of a failed state, Nigeria is still an emerging power (2012, 16) .
While it does recognise there are structural issues that lead to support for Boko Haram, and that the legacy of colonialism is important, this proposal is alarming and suggests recent calls for international intervention may not fall on deaf ears. The March 2013 establishment of a US drone base in neighbouring Niger, a facility that would station around 300 US troops (Obama 2013; Campbell 2013b) , has already committed the US to a long-term presence in the region. The tension within Robertson's piece is that while she believes US involvement could prevent an all-out war, this is increasingly how things are developing, in part inspired by US actions. As the ICG suggests, dialogue has been tried but so far failed, with ten Boko Haram commanders meeting in Co'te d'Ivoire with representatives of the government. Despite what looked like a peace agreement, the United States placed bounties on Shekau and AQIM's Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, with the Jonathan government outlawing both groups. The process quickly collapsed (ICG 2014, 38) . The legacy of these decisions has been the events of the past year, with what President Jonathan has called 'total war' (BBC News 2014).
Conclusions
With fast-moving events such as these, it is impossible to offer definitive conclusions. Rather, the analysis here is intended to provide a background to recent events, and something of an interpretative lens to the wider contexts. Six key points should be taken from the analysis. First, the political geography of the group is important, both with its specific territorial base but also its actions in wider parts of Nigeria, and its frequent crossing of international boundaries. Second, the Federal Government of Nigeria is seeking to preserve the state's territorial integrity, both in the sense of territorial preservation and in terms of territorial sovereignty, but it is clear that the last at least is severely compromised, and its forces in the northeast are seen as an occupying force. Third, there are legal complexities associated with the group's aims, both in terms of its stated purpose of establishing Sharia, and tensions with Federal law (see Idowu 2013). Fourth, US and UK and other Western power's involvement in the country has been underway for some time, but more is likely in the future, especially given the higher media profile of recent events. While Barack Obama has said that 'no American security operation can eradicate the threat posed by an extremist group like Boko Haram', he did also suggest that the US would support Nigerian efforts -both to find the missing girls but also to educate (2014). Fifth, and perhaps under-appreciated by a West-centric media, Nigeria's involvement in the AFISMA Mali force, which led to its troops moving through Niger, broadens the geopolitical issues. Sixth, to understand Boko Haram, what they are opposing, and responses to their actions, it is necessary to examine the geopolitical issues alongside biopolitical issues.
As Nigeria enters election year in 2015, with longstanding north-south and religious issues set to re-emerge as major points of concern (Oyeniyi 2014; ICG 2014, 39-40) , these issues may reach a new intensity. Jonathan, in particular, needs some kind of 'victory' to help his re-election campaign. What form this might take is not clear. Most responses to violence are combinations of 'three broad forms, namely, militarizing, criminalizing and the liberal approach' (Yusuf 2013, 377; following Jarvis 2009, 12) . Having tried the first two, with little success, the third is again being reconsidered with dialogue going on through intermediaries (Lam 2014; Oyeniyi 2014) . Like in the Delta, some compromise and possible amnesty seems the most likely outcome (Sampson 2013; Nwankpa 2014) . The alternative, of wider international involvement, whether from former regional colonial powers or the United States, seems certain to make matters worse.
